Furor Gallicus: What if France had not fallen in World War Two?

Heres an excerpt from an alternate history scenario I've been working on. Here, France manages to survive the initial Nazi onslaught in the spring of 1940, drastically changing the course of World War Two.

Winter 1939-1940: The rival plans

The Polish surrender on September 27, 1939, left the Third Reich to turn to the West and face down the Anglo-French alliance that had thus far been ineffective in halting German aggression. For their part, the Allies were left to contemplate how best to prosecute the war against Fascism. The bitter winter that year prevented any kind of operational movements, and the General Staffs on both sides were left to contemplate how best to prosecute the upcoming 1940 campaign.

In the West, the Allied staffs formulated what became known as Plan D. It was obvious to both sides that the main arena of battle in 1940 would be the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Since the Franco-German frontier was defended by the formidable fortifications of the Maginot Line, the Belgian route offered the only alternative for an invasion route (as it had in 1914). Perceiving this threat, General Maurice Gamilin, the Allied C. in C, planned to send the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F) and one French Corps into Belgium to the River Escaut. Here the allied force would entrench and await the arrival of the retreating Belgian Army. However, the Escaut plan was flawed in that it only safeguarded a small portion of Belgium, as well as extending the overall frontage that the Allies had to defend. Thus, the Allied command altered the plan to the much more ambitious Dyle Plan (Plan D). This called for the BEF, the French 1^st Army, and part of the French 9^th Army to advance all the way to the Dyle River, east of Brussels. This put a much larger area of Belgium under allied protection while at the same time shortening the overall frontage of their armies. During early 1940 the Allied High Command considered an even more ambitious variant of Plan D, featuring the so called “Breda maneuver.” This entailed sending the French 7^th Army all the way to Breda, in the southern Netherlands, thus linking the Dutch army (9 infantry divisions) to the Allied formation to the south. However, after an intense debate within allied high command it was decided to abandon the Breda maneuver, as it would: a) give the 7^th army the impossible task of advancing some 200 kilometers to a position that would in all likelihood already be occupied by the enemy, and b) deprive the First Army Group[1] its only mobile reserve. Thus it was decided to shelve the Breda maneuver in favor of the original Plan D, despite the fact that this meant Dutch would be left to fend for themselves.[2]

A similar debate was taking place in the German High Command. The German plan, Fall Gleb was a modified version of the 1914-vintage von Schlieffen Plan. Army Group B (Fedor von Bock) was tasked with marching into Belgium north of the Meuse, while Army Group A (Gerd von Rundstedt) was to operate on Bock’s southern Flank in a supporting role. The key to this plan was the drive of Bock’s 4^th Army (Gunther von Kluge), reinforced with the majority of the Reich’s Panzer divisions, was to drive through the Gembloux gap[3] and north to the sea, trapping and destroying the allied forces defending Brussels. The original plan called for only the small corner of Southern Holland around Maastricht to be violated; it was hoped that the Dutch would not view this as a casus beli and remain neutral. However, Goring feared that Holland could become a base for British air and Sea power, and the plan was modified to allow for the conquest of the Netherlands by the 18^th Army (von Kuchler). The conquest of Holland would also provide air and sea bases for Germany to attack Britain. German High Command did not believe they could achieve a complete victory in 1940; Fall Gleb was intended for the seizure of the Low Contries and France as far south as the Somme. From here air attacks and U-Boats strikes could be launched against the British, while the Whermacht could continue to pose a threat to the heart of France.

The limited objectives of the offensive caused a major debate within the German High Command. Conservative generals like Bock and Brauchits (the German Chief of Staff) respected the power of the French Army and feared the consequences of an more ambitious offensive. Opposing them were Hienz Guderian, architect of the Blitzkrieg tactics that had brought Germany success in Poland, and Erich von Manstien, a staff officer with a bold mind for strategy. Manstien advocated the transfer of the bulk of the Panzerwaffe to Army Group A, where it would strike through the lightly defended Ardennes Forest region, cross the Meuse, and drive to the Channel. Furthermore Manstien’s plan called for the use of paratroopers, untested in combat thus far, to drop into the heart of Holland to bring about a quick end to that campaing, and an airborne assault on the Belgian border fortress of Eben Emeal. Manstien’s plan drew support from the bold Guderian, as well as Runstedt, who favored the more important role his army would play in Manstien’s plan. The conservative general’s opposed the plan on grounds that, even in Poland German tanks had proven vulnerable and the Luftwaffe had suffered heavier losses than expected.[4] While Hitler had been lukewarm on the original Fall Gleb plan, he also remembered the failure of the over-ambitious Schlieffen plan in 1914. He was also aware that the German war industry was not as strong as he would have the world to believe, and any disaster involving the Panzers would be difficult to make up for. Additionally, he believed conquering the Low Countries would be enough to convince the Allies to abandon their war and make peace, so he could turn to the Bolshevik East that he truly desired to destroy. Eventually Hitler ordered a compromise: the main weight of the offensive would lie with Army Group B, with 2 Panzer divisions driving east with 6^th army and 4 moving through the Gembloux Gap with the 4th, while Army group A would receive 2 Panzer divisions to exploit any unforeseen breakthrough on the Meuse. Additonally, 1 Panzer division would be attached to 18^th Army to crack the Dutch fortification system. The untested paratroops would be kept in reserve for a possible strike against the Maginot Line, or even England. Thus Manstien’s plan was shelved for good, and Germany was to go into the 1940 campaign with a more modest version of the Plan which had failed in 1914. [5]

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[1] French First Army Group ( General Billotte) consisted of the BEF, and the French 1^st, 2^nd, 9^th, and 7^th Armies. It was responsible for the front between the Maginot Line and the Channel.

[2] In actuality, the Allies did adopt the Breda Maneuver in 1940, which was a major reason for the subsequent disaster,

[3] East of Brussels the Dyle River and Albert Canal formed a considerable obstacle to tanks and mechanized forces, while to the south the River Meuse provided a similar barrier. However, around the village of Gembloux, a gap existed between the Dyle and the Meuse, and the flat open country in the area was perfect for tank operations.

[4] Until 1941, the Bulk of Germany’s tanks were Mark I’s and Mark II’s, neither of which was suited for combat.

[5] In reality, Manstien’s plan was adopted, and the bold strike through the Ardennes contributed to Germany’s great victory. While Hitler did indeed like Manstien’s ideas, the definitive decision to adopt them only came after a German plane carrying the original plan crashed in Belgium in January 1940, thus compromising its secrecy.